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Abstract
In the last several years IEEE 802.15.4 [1] has been
accepted as a major MAC layer protocol for wireless sen-
sor networks (WSNs) and has attracted the interest of the
research community involved in security issues as the in-
creased range of application scenarios bring out new pos-
sibilities for misuse and taking improper advantage of sen-
sor nodes and their operation. As these nodes are very re-
source restrained such possible attacks and their early de-
tection must be carefully considered. This paper surveys the
known attacks on wireless sensor networks, identifies and
investigates a new attack, Guaranteed Time Slot (GTS) at-
tack, taking as a basis the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC protocol for
WSN. The GTS Attack is simulated with different scenarios
using ns-2 and the results are evaluated both from the point
of view of the attacked and the attacker.
1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have many potential
applications. In the ubiquitous environment enhanced with
actuator capabilities they can materialize the interface be-
tween people and the environment by establishing a context
for a great variety of applications ranging from environmen-
tal monitoring to assisted living and emergency measures
and transport. In many of these scenarios, WSNs are of in-
terest to adversaries and are easily prone to attacks as they
are usually deployed in open and unrestricted environments.
In many cases single nodes might be unattended and can be
even physically destroyed or reprogrammed.
An attack on a WSN in general is defined as a defective
action on the efficient operations of the whole system or a
malicious invasion on a specific part of the network [2]. The
attacker can be an adversary within the network that attacks
with the aim of damaging some nodes of the WSN or gain-
ing more selfish benefits on the provided services than the
other legitimate users. On the other hand the attacker may
exploit protocol weaknesses to obtain network resources to
his own benefit by depriving others or simply to cause dis-
rupt in the operation of the network. The basic feature of
attacks and misbehavior strategies is that they are entirely
unpredictable [3]. Early definition and investigation of pos-
sible attacks and misbehavior patterns can provide valuable
insight into reliable and timely detection which is a main
prerequisite for ensuring proper operation and minimization
of performance losses in WSNs.
In this paper a new type of MAC layer attack is defined,
called the Guaranteed Time Slot (GTS) attack, which is
based on the inherent properties of the IEEE 802.15.4 su-
perframe organization in beacon-enabled operational mode
for WSNs. The sequence of communication for realizing a
GTS attack is presented, four different possible attack sce-
narios are defined and their ns-2 implementation results are
presented and evaluated. From here on the paper is orga-
nized as follows: Section 2 covers the related work on at-
tacks in WSN and their definitions, Section 3 identifies the
new attack and presents the evaluation from the point of
view of the attacker and the attacked taking into considera-
tion both incurred damage and related energy consumption
and finally Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
The known attacks in IEEE 802.15.4 WSNs can be clas-
sified into different categories according to different tax-
onomical representations. In this section the attacks for
wireless sensor networks are categorized with regards to the
different OSI layers whose operation and functions are at-
tacked, destroyed or damaged, such as physical layer, MAC
layer attacks, or routing layer attacks [4].
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Physical layer attacks cover mainly the radio jamming
or signal jamming modifications aiming to corrupt the com-
munication within the channel due to frequency interfer-
ences. If jamming is handled as just emitting signals instead
of sending packets, it is called radio jamming at the physical
layer.
MAC layer attacks have attracted a lot of interest and
there are a number of studies in this respect [2, 3, 5, 6].
MAC layer attacks are mainly targeted at the IEEE 802.15.4
data link layer specifications to achieve denial of service
(DoS). Attackers generally aim to disrupt the channel using
IEEE 802.15.4 procedures or to consume the channel re-
sources unfairly through modifying the IEEE 802.15.4 pro-
tocol definitions in a selfish and malicious manner. In the
following we present a brief description of some various
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer attack types.
Jamming attack is basically constructing radio interfer-
ence to cause a DoS on transmitting or receiving nodes.
Xu et. al. [7] classified the jammers as constant, decep-
tive, random, and reactive according to their radio jamming
strategies. Link layer jamming is fundamentally creating
collision at the link layer by jamming packets rather than
signals. An intelligent jammer that knows the link layer pro-
tocol logics misbehaves in the channel to deprive the legiti-
mate users from gaining access to the medium. Rather than
a blind jammer that emits signals or useless packets ran-
domly without knowing the protocol logics, an intelligent
jammer, from the point of the energy usage, aims to attack
at specific times to preserve its energy [8]. Back-off ma-
nipulation is defined as selfishly and constantly choosing a
small back-off interval in IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordi-
nation Function (DCF) rather than applying the rules of the
protocol for choosing a random back-off period [6]. Back-
off manipulation is applicable to both IEEE 802.11 wireless
networks and IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor networks due
to their similar CSMA-CA based protocols. Same-nonce at-
tack is related to the access control lists (ACL) identifying
the nodes that data can be received from [9]. In order to
be used in an encrypted transmission, ACL entry includes
the destination address, the key, the nonce and option fields.
If the sender uses the same key and nonce pairs within two
transmissions, an adversary obtaining those ciphertexts may
retrieve useful information [10]. Replay-protection attack
targets the replay protection mechanism provided in IEEE
802.15.4 specification. This mechanism is used to accept a
frame by checking whether the counter of the recent mes-
sage is larger than the previous one. If an adversary sends
many frames with large counters to a legitimate node, the
legitimate user using the replay protection mechanism will
reject the legitimate frames with small counters from other
nodes [9]. ACK attack [9] can be accomplished by eaves-
dropping the channel. An eavesdropper, firstly, may block
the receiver node from taking the transmitted packet, then,
can mislead the sender node by sending a fake ACK that
it comes from the receiver. PANId conflict attack [2] cre-
ates a fake conflict within a Personal Area Network (PAN).
The members of a PAN know the PAN coordinator’s iden-
tifier (PANId). If there exist more than one PAN coordi-
nator operating in same Personal Operating System (POS),
a PANId conflict occurs [1]. An adversary may send fake
PANId conflict notification messages to PAN coordinator
in order to make PAN coordinator execute conflict resolu-
tion procedure, which delays the communication between
the PAN coordinator and the legitimate nodes [2].
Routing layer attacks are usually designed to hinder the
route selection mechanism or routing strategy. A routing
layer attacker possibly attacks the operation at the network
layer at route discovery time, or at route selection time, or
after the establishment of the routes [5]. For a wireless sen-
sor network, an example for the routing layer attack on route
discovery process is the fake route information attack pro-
viding incorrect routing data to the network [11]. Some at-
tacks on routing selection processes are i.) HELLO flood
attacks [12] to convince the receiving nodes that the attacker
is within one-hop transmission range indeed the attacker has
a high-power transmission and is far away, ii.) sinkhole at-
tacks [12] to attract the neighboring nodes of an attacker to
forward their packets through the attacker, iii.) wormhole
attacks [13], by at least two negotiated attackers supporting
tunneling the packets within the low-delay path established
between each other, to fool the legitimate users for relaying
the packets earlier, iv.) sybil attacks [14] providing more
than one different identifications to the network to make the
attacker be more possibly selected on many routes. An ex-
ample for the attacks on established routes is blackhole at-
tack [15] causing the node to drop all or selectively some
received packets. More details about routing layer attack
types can be found in [11].
3. GTS attack
3.1. Definition of Guaranteed Time Slots
and their assignment
In the IEEE 802.15.4 standards [1], GTS slots are de-
fined as part of the superframe for collision free transmis-
sion. Each slot is exclusively dedicated to a single device.
A device must track beacons in order to request and allocate
a GTS slot. The PAN coordinator decides whether to accept
a GTS allocation of a device and may give more than one
slot if there are available slots. There are 7 slots provided for
GTS transmission in the contention free period (CFP) of the
superframe. The GTS allocation policy is first-come-first-
serve and GTS slots are located after the contention access
period (CAP). Figure 1 shows the usual communication se-
quence of a GTS slot allocation scenario.
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Figure 1. Communication sequence in GTS
allocation.
First of all, the node must receive the beacon success-
fully in order to synchronize with the coordinator. After
receiving the beacon, the node can communicate with the
coordinator in CAP. Secondly, the node sends a GTS Allo-
cation request to PAN coordinator. The GTS request mes-
sage includes the length and direction. The GTS direction
can be defined as either transmit or receive. On receipt of
this command, the PAN coordinator may send an ACK to
indicate the successful reception of GTS request. Then, the
PAN coordinator checks for available slots in the current
superframe within aGTSDescPersistenceTime superframes
time. If there are available slots, new GTS information is
included in the following beacon. The GTS requesting node
receives the beacon and extracts the GTS transmission time
if it is inserted by the PAN coordinator. In this case, the
GTS transmission is successfully achieved as seen in Fig-
ure 1. If no GTS descriptor is found in the superframe, the
node notifies the next upper layer of failure. The device can
deallocate its GTS Slot in the same way as seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Communication sequence in GTS
deallocation.
The above mentioned GTS management including re-
quest, allocation and deallocation is based on IEEE
802.15.4 explicit standards [1]. In addition to this pro-
cedure, some modified GTS allocation schemes have also
been proposed. Ji et. al. [16] proposed an efficient GTS
allocation algorithm for IEEE 802.15.4 that is capable of
traffic analysis. Their GTS allocation scheme is based
on packet arrival rate and number of devices in the net-
work. When devices are transmitting, the ones with the
higher packet transmission rate can cause more collisions
and longer delay compared to ones with the lower rate. So,
their scheme allocates the GTS slots to devices with the
higher packet rates. The proposed GTS algorithm also uses
the number of nodes due to at most 7 GTS slots being ready
for allocation. Ji et. al. [16] constructed a 17-node IEEE
802.15.4 star topology in order to compare their proposed
GTS allocation machanism with the standard one. By trac-
ing the packet delivery rates, it is shown that their proposed
scheme achieves 16% higher throughput than the standard
one. Additionally, the amount of dropped packets caused
by collisions is decreased significantly. By tuning the al-
gorithm’s parameters, they reach a 18% improvement on
average throughput.
One of the basic disadvantage of the standard GTS man-
agement scheme is that the number of nodes having GTS
slots is limited by 7. So, the GTS slots can be quickly con-
sumed by a few number of nodes and devices with low data
rates can cause the underutilization of the GTS resources.
To overcome these problems, Koubaa et. al. [17, 18] pro-
posed a GTS allocation approach, which is based on the
idea that a slot can be used by more than one node. By
considering the arrangement of GTS request arrivals with
traffic specifications and the delay parameters, their algo-
rithm makes a decision about the slot sharing policy among
the nodes sending requests. They provide a kind of round-
robin scheduling mechanism to prevent starvation, however
they indicate that some modified scheduling schemes can
be used. They implemented the proposed GTS algorithm
with nesC on micaZ platforms. Their experimental test bed
includes 1 PAN coordinator and 7 motes which are located
under the transmission range of the PAN coordinator. The
experiment results show that this implicit GTS management
mechanism, i-GAME, is more efficient in bandwidth uti-
lization than the explicit one defined in IEEE 802.15.4 stan-
dard.
3.2. Identified GTS attack
GTS slots create a vulnerable point which can allow an
attacker to disrupt the communication between a device and
its PAN coordinator. A possible attack scenario using the
GTS interval is illustrated in Figure 3. Assume that all the
nodes as well as the adversary, which is an intelligent at-
tacker device, have achieved synchronization with the co-
ordinator by receiving beacon messages. A legitimate node
may request a GTS slot by sending a GTS request command
to the PAN coordinator including the GTS descriptor. The
PAN coordinator may respond with an optional ACK for
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this GTS request. Meanwhile the coordinator handles the
GTS request. The coordinator may accept the GTS request
and allocate demanded GTS slot(s) or may reject it. The
accepted requests are announced in the following beacon
message broadcasted to all nodes. The adversary can learn
the GTS slot times through extracting the GTS descriptor(s)
from the beacon frame. After obtaining the allocated GTS
times, the adversary can create interference at any of these
moments. This interference will cause collision and corrup-
tion of the data packets between the legitimate GTS node
and the coordinator. The collision occurring during the GTS
period can be considered as a kind of DoS paradigm since
these slots are assumed to provide collision-free communi-
cation.
Figure 3. Communication sequence in GTS
attack scenario.
3.3. Evaluation
We have simulated the proposed GTS attack implemen-
tation on ns2.31 [19]. ns2.31 comes with IEEE 802.15.4
MAC layer protocol in which GTS data structures are de-
fined but GTS management methods are not implemented
[20, 21]. In the simulations, we have implemented and used
the explicit GTS management mechanism defined in IEEE
802.15.4 MAC layer standard [1].
Two types of attackers are defined in the simulations: in-
telligent attacker and random attacker. An intelligent at-
tacker aims at corrupting the communication in the GTS
slot with maximum length in the CFP, whereas a random
attacker randomly chooses a GTS slot to be attacked. At-
tacking to a slot, which is allocated for communication be-
tween the PAN coordinator and a legitimate user, can be
achieved by creating a collision through jamming or send-
ing messages within that slot. In our simulations, both at-
tackers corrupt the communication by sending a message
to the coordinator at the starting time of the selected GTS
slots.
A star network with ten nodes has been simulated, of
which at most two attackers are on duty. Four types of sce-
Table 1. GTS request schedule.
NodeID Request Length(slots) Request Time(s)
7 3 25
8 5 28
6 2 31
4 1 35
5 1 40
narios are defined: ”one intelligent attacker” (OIA), ”one
random attacker” (ORA), ”two intelligent attackers” (TIA),
and ”two random attackers” (TRA). It is expected that, for
the ORA scenario, the adversary attacks the allocated slot of
an average length communication. In the case of TRA sce-
nario, two attackers may attack two different communica-
tions or may attack the same communication, in which case
the energy of the attackers is consumed to unconsciously
corrupt the same node communication. In contrast to this,
an intelligent attacker can use its energy in an efficient man-
ner by attacking the first slot of the communication that has
the maximum length in slots. For the TIA scenario, the ad-
versaries can cooperatively attack the nodes as one of them
attacking the maximum length communication (with the
maximum number of slots allocated) and the other attack-
ing the communication with the second maximum length.
For this last scenario, the common goal of the attackers is to
cause maximum possible decrease in bandwidth utilization
within the CFP period.
The predetermined GTS request schedule of the nodes
used in the simulations is given in Table 1. All of these re-
quests except the request of node 8 are accepted by the PAN
coordinator, and it is observed that the accepted requests are
announced in the GTS field attribute of the following bea-
cons. Nodes 1 and 2 are selected as intelligent attackers,
nodes 3 and 9 are selected as random attackers. The sim-
ulation results are gathered for 60s where the beacon inter-
val is set to 0.98304s. The number of total attack messages
sent, and corrupted slots for four different scenarios of OIA,
ORA, TIA and TRA respectively are given in Table 2.
In the first scenario, node 1 corrupts 35 different com-
munications each with 3 slot length of node 7 causing 105
slot corruptions. It means that, 105 out of 208 slot-time
data communication is prevented by the attack. Assuming
all other parameters equal, this prevention leads to 105/208
(50.48%) decrease in bandwidth utilization of CFP period.
Node 3 corrupts 35 different communications with random
slot lengths leading to 69 slot corruptions in the second sce-
nario. So, the utilization decrease in the second case is
33.17%. In the third case, two attackers totally broadcast
64 attack messages that result in 163 corruptions leading
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Table 2. The number of attack messages and
corrupted slots.
Scenario No Attack Messages Corrupted Slots
1 35 105
2 35 69
3 64 163
4 70 92
to a 78.36% decrease in utilization. The two random at-
tackers in the fourth scenario totally corrupt 92 slots using
70 attack messages and decrease the utilization by 44.23%.
Depending on the corrupted slots per attack messages, the
best scenario is the first one, the worst scenario is the fourth
one. Depending on the corrupted slots per unit time, the
best scenario is the third one, the worst scenario is the sec-
ond one. Consequently, the intelligent attack method causes
more damage to the sensor network communication than
the random attack, and cooperating attackers decrease band-
width utilization in CFP period more than a single attacker.
The attackers are also compared for their energy con-
sumptions in the attacks. ns-2 supports the simulation of the
energy use of the sensor nodes, therefore the energies of the
attackers have been traced within the simulations. Using the
scenarios in Table 1, the energy consumptions of one intelli-
gent attacker, one random attacker, two intelligent attackers,
and two random attackers during their 60-second attack pe-
riod is plotted in Figure 4. Figure 4 includes the consumed
energies of the attackers for corrupting the communication
slots. The energy exhaustion for each corrupted commu-
nication is calculated and recorded at the attacker nodes by
subtracting the current traced energy levels from their previ-
ous values after each attack. As seen in Figure 4, the slopes
of the intelligent attackers’ energy consumption curves are
lower than the ones of the random attackers’. Therefore,
intelligent attackers consume less energy per corrupted slot
than random attackers.
Figure 4. Energy consumed vs number of
corrupted slots.
Neither the intelligent attacker nor the random attacker
can be easily detected in GTS attack cases. Since the attack-
ers are synchronized with the PAN coordinator in a fine-
grained manner, the attack messages, which reveal colli-
sions in the channel, cannot be received by the coordinator.
Therefore, the coordinator can not perceive the ID of the
attacker. However, if the synchronization between the at-
tacker and the PAN coordinator is not fine-grained but still
allowing to communicate with a small drift in the attacker’s
clock, the adversary can emit regular packets in the GTS
interval to corrupt the communication, but can not attack
at the precise moments in the CFP slots. So, the coordi-
nator may be able to detect the attacker’s ID by extracting
the source field in the received packets. In other cases, in
which the adversary emits jamming signals instead of reg-
ular packets or emits regular packets at precise moments,
GTS attack is considered very hard to detect.
4. Conclusions
This paper investigates WSN attacks including a brief
survey of physical layer, MAC layer, and routing layer at-
tacks. Furthermore, a new IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer at-
tack, the GTS attack, is defined and evaluated with respect
to intelligent and random attacker behavior scenarios.
Based on the definition of the GTS attack, a sample
communication sequence of this attack, exploring the IEEE
802.15.4 specification, is designed. It is shown that a GTS
attack is possible. The implementation of the suggested ap-
proach with different scenarios is built using ns-2.31. To
study their effects on the communication process during the
CFP periods, the number of total corrupted slots and the
number of total collisions are analyzed in various attacker
cases, and the bandwidth utilization and energy consump-
tion evaluations of the results are presented.
It is observed that the intelligent attacker can achieve an
important decrease up to 75% in bandwidth utilization dur-
ing the CFP period communication. Also, from the view-
point of the attacker, an intelligent GTS attacker uses the
energy much more efficiently than a random GTS attacker.
Moreover, the intelligent attack method causes more dam-
age to the sensor network communication compared to the
random attack method.
Future work directions will focus on tunning different
parameters in the GTS attack scenarios. The detection prob-
ability will be investigated when there is a lack of fine-
grained time synchronization between the PAN coordinator
and the GTS attacker. Additionally, a GTS-based applica-
tion will be simulated and analyzed under GTS attack con-
ditions.
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